Verifying Sensitive Parameters Without Measuring Sensitive Values

A method is presented for verifying arms control agreementconditions relating to objects that the inspected party regards assensitive. The problem is to verify the condition without revealinganything more about a sensitive parameter; for example, verifyingthat the weight of an object exceeds a particular value withoutrevealing anything more about the weight. In the approach presented,the object is measured in combination with unknownvalues. Mathematical models are presented for which it is shownthat the treaty condition can be verified in a manner consistentwith a rigorously defined requirement that no additional informationregarding the sensitive parameter is revealed. Not all verificationsituations have such solutions; the mathematicalconditions required for solutions are identified, and a set of equationsfor calculating the unknown values is presented. It is thenshown how some of the limitations can be overcome with a moreelaborate, probabilistic approach.