Publication Date
Volume
37
Issue
4
Start Page
74
File Attachment
V-37_4.pdf2.64 MB
Abstract
The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for newnuclear facilities has the potential to reduce security risks and proliferationhazards while improving the synergy of major designfeatures and raising operational efficiency, in a world where significantexpansion of nuclear energy use may occur.Correspondingly, the U.S. Department of Energy’s NextGeneration Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) includes objectives tocontribute to international efforts to develop SBD, and to applySBD in the development of new U.S. nuclear infrastructure.Here, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure thetimely, efficient and cost effective integration of internationalsafeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with nationalmaterial control and accountability, physical protection, andsafety objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility,from initial planning through design, construction and operation.The SBD process, in its simplest form, may be appliedusefully today within most national regulatory environments.Development of a mature approach to implementing SBDrequires work in the areas of requirements definition, designprocesses, technology and methodology, and institutionalization.The U.S. efforts described in this paper are supportive of SBDwork for international safeguards that has recently been initiatedby the IAEA with the participation of many stakeholders includingmember states, the IAEA, nuclear technology suppliers,nuclear utilities, and the broader international nonproliferationcommunity.
Additional File(s) in Volume