A View on the FMCT: Its Importance and the Verification Scheme

A global regime of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons should evolve along with the changes in the international environment. These changes have occurred throughout history. During the early stage of the Cold War era, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was created and became the centerpiece of the global nonproliferation reg i m e . The NPT Extension Conference in 1995 and the 2000 Review Conference identified that the negotiation and early conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is a priority. Due to several reasons, however, the discussions on the FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament are not progressing. The importance of the FMCT is increased by the recent changes in the international political situation, i.e. problems with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, START, and the Additional Protocol to the NPT. When it does materialize, the FMCT will cap future increases of nuclear weapons. Moreover, if the international community chooses the approach of limiting the treaty’s scope to the future production of fissile material only, and hence the treaty does not touch upon the present stocks, it may be possible to obtain the agreement of some nuclear weapon states (NWS) on the substance of the treaty. Thus, commencement of discussions on the FMCT will contribute to progress on global disarmament and nonproliferation considerations. Many issues should be discussed regarding the content of the FMCT. Scope, definitions, verification schemes, structure of the treaty, and conditions for the entry into force are examples. Among those, the authors primarily will discuss the verification issue. The authors believe that the early conclusion of the negotiations is most important in the present political environment; therefore, the authors believe that some sort of compromise is needed in selecting a verification scheme. The authors will recommend that a type of focused verifi c ation approach be taken. Then, the authors will discuss the starting and termination points, initial inventory, and verification activities against a state’s declared and/or undeclared activities using routine and non-routine inspections. Finally, the authors will express their opinions on possible measures to accelerate the progress of international discussions on the FMCT.