A Chinese View on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

N egotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva have been at an impasse since 1993. The 2000 Review Conference for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) called for FMCT negotiations to start immediately and to be completed in five years. China’s participation in an FMCT will be critical to its success, however. Like the other four acknowledged nuclear weapon states, China is believed to have stopped producing HEU and plutonium for weapons, and China has consistently supported the FMCT negotiations. However, because of its concerns about U.S. missile defense plans, which China views as threatening the viability of its nuclear deterr e n t, China has recently expressed its unwillingness to enter FMCT negotiations without starting talks on agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space—since it is clear that the missile defense plans will inevitably intensify competition in outer space. To resume the FMCT negotiation, it is necessary to analyze the factors that may influence China’s position. In this paper, I will explore China’s possible position in upcoming FMCT negotiations, China’s major security concerns, the kind of verification provisions that could be accepted by China, and the factors that might facilitate China’s participation in the treaty.