Transparency and Openness: Roles and Limitations in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Verification System

While transparency has a long history of usage in arms control, the international safeguards community began to talk about “transparency and openness” in the aftermath of the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapon program in 1992. In 1994 Cecil Sonnier brought that discussion into the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) International Safeguards Division. In recognition of Sonnier’s dedication to the division, which he founded and chaired for two decades, a memorial activity was initiated in July 2004, shortly after his death. It was felt that a reexamination of transparency and openness would be a suitable memorial discussion topic. This reexamination has taken into account important developments during the past two years in the role of transparency and openness in international safeguards and nonproliferation, driven by the “special verification case” of Iran. 1 This paper reports on the results of this memorial activity.