Proliferation Resistance Methodology: How to Take Benefit from Nuclear Safety Approach

Proliferation resistance (PR) has become one of the primary topics addressed in the framework of developing nuclear energy systems. While it has been implemented successfully for a long time, the need to structure the methodology has arisen. Nuclear safety (NS) has already developed a comprehensive methodological framework to address the risk of accidents and the related release of radioactivity. There is a parallel with PR, in addressing the risk of diversion of nuclear material or the misuse of a facility. The fundamental principle of certainly be adapted to some extent to PR, in several ways: the concept of multiple barriers, the five levels of defense in depth, the implementation at all stages of development, and operation of the nuclear energy system. Other tools and approaches elaborated in NS can also be of relevance for PR, such as probabilistic risk assessment to assess the strength and robustness of a system and identify weak points, or the safety culture. This paper will elaborate on these topics. This paper aims at giving a firm basis of the concepts and their possible use. We recognize that this is only a first step that opens a wide field to implement them and derive effective results in concrete cases. This paper does not allow us to provide a detailed example, but we acknowledge current work in the United States and in Europe on some aspects (mainly probability safety assessment) and we encourage the practical use of the full methodology in proliferation resistance assessment. defense in depth developed in NS can