Estimation of Proliferation Risks for a Nuclear Export Control System

A technical review of exported commodities (both nuclear and dual use) plays an important role in the export control system of the Russian Federation, as well as in Minatom’s system of internal compliance. The current methods of export control are based largely on the qualitative approaches and estimations. The development of quantitative approaches and methods for estimating proliferation (and diversion) risk, as well as for developing similar methods for revealing indicators of proliferation, made on the basis of engineering analyses, would become a new stage in the development of export control. Currently, export controls offers control officers only lists of controlled commodities to use as the basic tool of export control and as an addition to their personal knowledge. The control lists contain descriptions of commodities that are sensitive in terms of proliferation and technical parameters on which the analysis is based. At the same time, by virtue of the variability of items in the nuclear sphere, the control lists cannot offer a complete set of analytical material, therefore some uncertainty regarding the sensitivity of commodities still exists. This uncertainty creates a “gray zone of knowledge” in which experts have to make a decision on the basis of their own qualitative estimation of proliferation risk, or on “common sense.” The present paper argues that qualitative estimation of proliferation risk can be improved and that quantitative estimation should be considered. This paper gives specific examples related to nuclear reactors.