Cooperation on International Safeguards Between the IAEA and South Africa

South Africa started cooperation with the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) in the 1960s with facility-type agreements(INFCIRC/66) for the SAFARI-1 Research reactor and KoebergNuclear Power Station reactors. No further agreements were concludeduntil termination of the South African (SA) weapons programand ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty(NPT) in 1991. Thereafter intense cooperation ensued with theIAEA through signing of a comprehensive safeguards agreement(INFCIRC/153), preparation of the completeness report fornuclear material inventory and nuclear facilities; and implementationof the comprehensive safeguards agreement. Notably, atthis early stage SA already granted access to IAEA inspectors toany facility at any location within SA in a fully cooperative andtransparent manner.SA has endeavored to strengthen the international safeguardsregime through participation in various IAEA activities (e.g.,MSSP, Program 93+2 and SAGSI), IAEA Board of Governorsand General Conference; and field trials on environmentalsampling and RMS. In 2002 the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) entered into force. Through the IAEA support programquantification and verification of HEU/LEU in waste fromthe weapons program and other nuclear facilities was intenselypursued until the present day.Working towards a more effective and efficient SSAC the SAsafeguards system was ISO 9001 certified in 2003. Best practices ofthe SA SSAC were shared in an IAEA SSAC workshop and throughthe preparation of the IAEA Nuclear Materials AccountingHandbook. SA participates in voluntary reporting schemes such asimport and export of nuclear materials. Further, SA fully cooperatedwith the IAEA in investigating the clandestine manufacture ofenrichment plant components in SA destined for Libya.On a regional basis SA in conjunction with the IAEA hosteda regional seminar to promote the conclusion of AdditionalProtocols by African states and an African regional workshop forSSACs. SA and the IAEA are evaluating and assessing the verificationand control systems at SA borders of mineral ores containinguranium and metals (e.g., cobalt and copper) containing highlevels of uranium as impurities.SA historical nuclear capabilities are utilized in new technologiessuch as the pebble bed modular reactor project for whicha new safeguards approach is being developed. Implementationof the IAEA state-level approach combined with the AnnualInspection Plan and transition to IS for SA poses specific challenges.