Recent JRC Achievements and Future Challenges in Verification for Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation

Publication Date
Volume
40
Issue
4
Start Page
11
Author(s)
W. Janssens - Joint Research Center -- Ispra
K. Luetzenkirchen - Joint Research Center -- Ispra
H. Emons - Joint Research Center -- Ispra
S. Abousahl - JRC
Y. Aregbe - Joint Research Center -- Ispra
R. Berndt - Joint Research Center -- Ispra
G. Cojazzi - Joint Research Center -- Ispra
M. Hedberg - Joint Research Center -- Ispra
F. Littmann - Joint Research Center -- Ispra
K. Mayer - Joint Research Center -- Ispra
P. Peerani - Joint Research Center -- Ispra
V. Sequeira - Joint Research Center -- Ispra
File Attachment
Abstract
Research and development (R&D) in nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation,and nuclear security is a cornerstone of the JointResearch Centre (JRC) Nuclear Safety and Security Work Program.The main stakeholders are the Euratom safeguards authorityand the International Atomic Energy Agency and closecontact is maintained with the nuclear facility plant operators.More recent customers include, e.g., authorities dealing withtrade of sensitive goods and those dealing with nuclear securitymeasures. This paper illustrates a number of the latestJRC safeguards and nonproliferation related developments,describing the rationale for the R&D, the recent achievements,the continuing challenges, and the outlook for deploymentin future nuclear fuel cycle facilities and activities.With respect to the nuclear materials verification, examples ofrecent developments focus on the front end of the nuclear fuelcycle, high-level quality systems, and quality control tools for themeasurements in enrichment and reprocessing facilities and thefuel cycle back end. At the facility level, continued emphasis isput on enhanced process monitoring and modeling of materialflows, advanced sealing and surveillance techniques, and unattendedand remotely operated systems. Both inside and outsidethe facility, environmental sampling and other verification methods(e.g., laser-based methods and satellite imagery) continue topose challenges. With respect to the overall evaluation and/orverification of state activities and capabilities, open-source analysis,mainly focusing on trade of sensitive technologies, proves toprovide significant potential. Finally at the conceptual level, theactivities of safeguards by design and assessment of proliferationresistance of future nuclear fuel cycles allow to both assess andintegrate the developments previously referred to. The paradigmof nuclear safety, security and safeguards is also shortly touchedupon in this paper.
Additional File(s) in Volume
V-40_1.pdf4.11 MB
V-40_2.pdf5.17 MB
V-40_3.pdf4.47 MB