

**UNDERSTANDING STATES' EXPERIENCE IN SAFEGUARDS:  
CHALLENGES TO AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENTRY INTO FORCE AND IMPLEMENTATION**

Noah C. Mayhew

Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

## **I. Introduction**

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), States and groups of States have long engaged in outreach and capacity building on safeguards with the goal of universality of comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) and additional protocols (APs), as well as the amendment or rescission of outdated small quantities protocols (SQPs).<sup>i</sup> This effort entails working with countries under a wide range of circumstances that drive them towards taking action on safeguards and present unique challenges to them taking such action. In 2022-2023, the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP), in partnership with the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), conducted a project with a view to identifying these drivers and challenges, understanding the ways in which States mitigated challenges, and formulating recommendations to increase the impact of outreach and capacity building activities.<sup>ii</sup> The paper presents the findings of this study, as well as the recommendations informed by extensive consultation with Member States that have taken recent action on their CSAs, APs or SQPs.

## **II. Summary of Findings**

During the VCDNP-VERTIC project, interviews were conducted with representatives from 17 States that had recently taken action on safeguards.<sup>1</sup> The interviewees were individuals who had personal involvement in their State's decision to, or process of, taking action on safeguards. While many of the individuals interviewed were from national regulatory bodies, they also included diplomats posted abroad, officials from ministries of foreign affairs, defence and energy, National Liaison Officers, National Liaison Assistants and others.

Following the interviews, the project team divided the preliminary findings into five themes, as discussed below. Based on these themes, the VCDNP and VERTIC held a workshop in Vienna, Austria with representatives from the interviewed States and experts from international and non-governmental organisations. The goal of the workshop was to formulate recommendations based on the themes for the IAEA, States and groups of States that conduct outreach and capacity building activities to maximise the impact of such activities. It was essential for the project team that these recommendations be Member State-driven.

The themes identified during the project include:

- **Peaceful Uses.** The majority of States interviewed stressed that action taken on safeguards had been driven by the desire to expand access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science and technology.
- **Non-Proliferation.** As important for the majority of States interviewed was the desire to stress their commitment to the global non-proliferation regime, including obligations under

---

<sup>1</sup> In the context of the project, to "take action on safeguards" is used collectively to refer to a State: bringing into force a CSA; signing, having approved by the IAEA Board of Governors or bringing into force an AP; and amending or rescinding an SQP (as applicable to the State concerned).

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as their safeguards instruments.

- **Leveraging.** Interviewees referenced the utility of leveraging other mechanisms for action on safeguards, including: (1) utilising pre-existing national committees established for purposes other than safeguards to take advantage of political momentum; (2) responsibly leveraging expanded access to peaceful uses as a way to motivate action on safeguards; and (3) expanding the role of and support from regional organisations, such as the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE).
- **Awareness.** All of the States interviewed for the project emphasised the importance of awareness raising among all stakeholders within their governments, in particular the effectiveness of a “top-down, bottom-up” approach to outreach and capacity building.
- **Capacity.** Many interviewees emphasised that capacity building in safeguards could itself be a catalyst for States to take action on safeguards; that capacity building is an activity that can promote entry into force and that it should be continuous after entry into force to support sustainable implementation.

The themes and the related recommendations are discussed in further detail below. It is important to emphasise the three groups which the recommendations target: the IAEA, States and groups of States. There are some recommendations for activities that one of these groups already engages in, but that another does not and could support or conduct themselves in a complementary way. There are still others that reflect ongoing activities that could be amplified or conducted differently.

### **III. Access to Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology**

The majority of IAEA Member States joined the Agency for the promise of access to peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology for development. While receiving assistance from the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation (TC) Programme does not inherently require the application of safeguards, it is understood that the beneficiaries of TC activities should establish regulatory systems for the use of nuclear and other radioactive material. If the recipient State is party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it is required to conclude a CSA with the IAEA to be applied on “all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.”<sup>iii</sup>

Many of the State representatives with whom the project team spoke remarked on the value of using expanded access to peaceful uses as incentive for a State either taking action on safeguards or engaging in other activities to support proper safeguards implementation. For example, as detailed in the final project report, Benin was motivated to bring its CSA with an SQP into force, establish a regulatory body and pass its nuclear law out of its desire for a radiotherapy programme for cancer treatment.

Many also remarked on the need for regulatory capacity to grow in step with expanded access to peaceful uses, particularly considering many countries that have yet to take action on safeguards are developing countries or least-developed countries (LDCs). For example, many of these States are unlikely to have the capacity to establish a completely independent regulator from the beginning, as is common practice. Rather, for such States it may make more sense to

house the regulatory body within a relevant ministry until such time as the State's regulatory capacity is up to speed with any peaceful uses activities it is engaged in.

Under this theme it was also noted that simply raising awareness about the benefits of peaceful uses can incentivise countries to take action on safeguards. Those interviewed for the study agreed that negative perceptions related to "all things nuclear" makes the work of regulators harder. Some also said that these negative perceptions can disincentivise action by politicians, who usually prioritise legislation that benefits their public image.

Bearing in mind these insights, the project team's analysis and the workshop with Member States yielded the following recommendations.

1. When engaging with countries which are not yet members of the IAEA or have little to no nuclear activities, the IAEA, States and groups of States should recall the challenges faced by these countries related to lack of capacity and high-level awareness of the benefits of peaceful uses. In this regard, the following outreach approaches could be considered. First, share experiences of other similarly situated States where regulatory functions are anchored in a relevant ministry (such as health or agriculture), and safety, security and safeguards are combined under one regulator. Second, facilitate national or regional events where peaceful uses and related IAEA initiatives, such as Rays of Hope (radiotherapy for cancer treatment), can be promoted to high-level policymakers.
2. More opportunities should be created to engage policymakers on health, agriculture and finance, including parliamentarians, on the benefits of peaceful uses and the States' safeguards obligations. This allows decision-makers further occasion to engage directly with experts from the IAEA and build understanding of peaceful uses and safeguards.
3. Strategies for safeguards outreach should take into account the extent to which the State uses nuclear and other radioactive material and take steps to support the State, such that the cost of implementing safeguards do not outweigh the benefits of peaceful uses, either in reality, or in perception.
4. Outreach and capacity-building efforts aiming to increase a State's regulatory capabilities should support an approach that is in step with and in proportion to its peaceful uses programme. In this regard, consideration should be given to the development of a graded "roadmap" approach to regulatory capacity building, perhaps with the support of research conducted by non-governmental organisations.

#### **IV. Stressing Non-Proliferation Commitments**

Another motivating factor for taking action on safeguards that States often cited was the desire to demonstrate their commitment to international non-proliferation norms. For some, high standards in nuclear governance, including but not limited to safeguards, are domestically considered prerequisites to responsible statehood and participation in the international system. For others, taking action on safeguards was motivated by the perceived need to demonstrate their non-proliferation commitments to other States, in some cases as a confidence-building measure to assuage concerns about proliferation and in others to be a "model State," encouraging other States to follow suit.

A perhaps obvious, but nevertheless important insight from the project is that many States from whom action on safeguards is required are unaware of the value of strong safeguards. In some cases, these States may be unaware of their obligations under the NPT or their safeguards

agreement altogether, or unable to take action on their APs or SQPs due to capacity issues or domestic political conditions. This is particularly true in cases where a new regulatory authority or other body responsible for safeguards implementation is established. In the case of Cameroon, for example, after its radiation authority was established in 2007, it began to consider which treaties and conventions the country should accede to. Following receipt of a letter from Director General Grossi and explanations at the General Conference on the simplified process of SQP amendment, Cameroon was able to amend its SQP in 2019.<sup>2</sup> At this time, Cameroon already had an AP in force and was keen to demonstrate its non-proliferation commitments – it was simply unaware of the amendment process.

Another trend noted from the interviews conducted under the project was utilising existing momentum in non-proliferation. For example, while a State is considering a host of international agreements to which it might accede, this presents opportunities for outreach and capacity building. This is particularly true when regulatory functions for implementing one instrument are entrusted to the same body responsible for safeguards implementation. Often, it is “safeguards champions” – individuals who are aware of the need to strengthen safeguards in their State and motivated to affect change in this regard – who generate or maintain this momentum and use it to convince their own governments of the value of taking action.

Considering the above insights, the following recommendations were made under the project.

5. As demonstrating the value of taking action on safeguards can be difficult for countries that have little or no nuclear material, those conducting outreach and capacity building activities should formulate State- or region-specific strategies to provide credible answers to the question “what’s in it for us?”. More effectively demonstrating the value of safeguards for such countries would advance existing outreach activities. Moreover, sharing those strategies with others that conduct outreach and capacity building, perhaps through the establishment of a formal outreach forum that meets annually, would benefit the outreach activities of all.
6. As non-proliferation and peaceful uses comprise two of the three pillars under the NPT, States Parties to the treaty should consider outreach and capacity building activities during the review cycle. This could include a commitment in the final document of the next NPT Review Conference to support developing countries and LDCs in their efforts to establish and maintain regulatory bodies and State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSACs), while also supporting expanded access to peaceful uses. Such support would need to be concrete, time-bound and involve both financial and technical contributions from a variety of States, including those that do not already conduct such activities.
7. The IAEA, States and groups of States should collaboratively explore the complementarity of safeguards with other issues in nuclear governance when planning for, implementing and evaluating the effect of safeguards outreach. Particularly for developing countries and LDCs, safeguards legislation and implementation often overlaps with such subjects as export controls, nuclear security, radiological security, nuclear safety and border control

---

<sup>2</sup> Amending or rescinding outdated SQPs based on the original 1974 model can be beneficial for the State concerned. The process required for amending or rescinding outdated SQPs is a simple one, as detailed in this brief: Noah Mayhew and Kseniia Pirnavskaia, “How States Benefit from Amending or Rescinding Small Quantities Protocols,” Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 8 June 2022. Available at: <https://vcdnp.org/sqp-brief-first-edition/>.

policies. Considering outreach for many of these related fields together could increase capacity across the board in a more effective and efficient way.

8. In this regard, more research should be done on how to maximise the complementarities between nuclear safety, security and safeguards (3S), in particular as concerns conditions in developing countries. Such research could be funded by national governments and carried out by non-governmental organisations. The value of non-governmental organisations doing such work is that they remain neutral of any national agenda and are likely to have the ability to dedicate time to in-depth research.
9. While the value of frequent reminders could be considered “nagging”, many Member State representatives interviewed for this study remarked on the great value of regular outreach to remind States of the need to take action on safeguards in order to fulfil non-proliferation commitments. In particular, for States with very small offices dealing with these issues, a lack of response doesn’t mean “no” – it may simply be indicative of very low bandwidth.

## **V. Leveraging Pre-existing National and Regional Structures**

One way States have been able to overcome issues with capacity is through the utilisation of existing national structures, such as high-level committees or commissions, that were established for one purpose to make progress on another. The value in using such structures is that they tend to be cross-sectoral involving inter-ministerial participation by high-level officials at relevant ministries, and sometimes the ministers themselves. Often these same structures work on a number of nuclear issues, including TC, nuclear security, nuclear safety, export controls, and radiation safety. They are particularly useful when they have direct access to heads of State and meet on a regular basis.

Particularly salient in this regard was the complementarity of safeguards with other disciplines. Often in developing countries and LDCs, the responsibility for safeguards lies with the same individuals as for nuclear security, nuclear safety, export controls or similar. Similarly, the legislation required for each of these disciplines will contain similar and complementary provisions that are worth concluding at the same time to avoid inefficiency and ensure effectiveness in implementation.

In this same vein, it is worth considering the value of existing structures, such as cross-sectoral and inter-ministerial commissions or committees that were established initially for the purpose of bringing into force or implementing other nuclear-related instruments, and were later utilised for safeguards. This was the approach that Guinea-Bissau took; such a commission was established by the Bissau-Guinean government for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and later used to address safeguards issues. Insofar as it is possible, those interviewed stressed that such bodies should include high-level representation from as many government offices as possible and be used to address a number of issues simultaneously.

From the perspective of those doing outreach and capacity building, the value of understanding the domestic legislative processes and political realities of the countries concerned and tailoring outreach strategies as such was emphasised. Participants also noted the potentially expanded role of regional organisations, such as ABACC (the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials), Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community), APSN (the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network) and implementing bodies or secretariats of nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties.

10. When engaging with States on safeguards, the establishment of cross-sectoral, inter-ministerial commissions or committees on nuclear matters should be encouraged. Such bodies should meet regularly (for example, once a week or once a month) and have direct access to ministers or individuals in equivalent positions, and even the offices of the heads of State or government.
11. The establishment of a 3S regulator that potentially also deals with other disciplines such as export controls or customs policy can be useful for ensuring effective and efficient standards in nuclear governance. This practice would also help facilitate further access to peaceful uses, insofar as it is responsible for regulating arrangements between the IAEA and end users in the State. Planning, implementation and evaluation of outreach practices should consider this practice, especially for small States, developing States or LDCs with new regulatory bodies or SSACs, and for those just establishing them.
12. Regional bodies (such as Euratom, AFCONE, OPANAL, ASEAN and APSN) and groups of States (such as Friends of the Additional Protocol), should share their experiences with one another on safeguards outreach and capacity building in order to increase the impact of these activities. This could be done through the establishment of an outreach forum, as noted in the section on “Stressing Non-Proliferation Commitments”.
13. More research should be conducted on the domestic legislative processes of countries in the nuclear field in order to inform strategies for safeguards outreach for individual countries. While this practice is conducted by some, it would benefit from research conducted by non-governmental organisations that have the bandwidth to provide in-depth analysis on opportunities and challenges for encouraging States to take action on safeguards. This research could be funded by States and/or groups of States that already conduct outreach and capacity building already.
14. The IAEA should conduct regular, internal workshops to compare notes between the Departments of Safeguards, Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security, Nuclear Applications, and Technical Cooperation, as well as the Office of Legal Affairs on their outreach efforts, with which countries they are liaising and what the effect of outreach has been. This would increase coordination on outreach within different departments and offices and increase the effect of such outreach.

## **VI. Raising Awareness at All Levels**

Raising awareness about safeguards instruments and the obligations they entail is a key goal of safeguards outreach. The discussions and interviews under this project show that awareness raising is critical to support, and in some cases can catalyse, national action on safeguards. For this to be effective, awareness needs to reach various level of government and related stakeholders.

Interviewees noted that, in particular, it is important to raise awareness on: general awareness of what IAEA safeguards are and why they are important; awareness of specific instruments and what a nation could do to advance safeguards (such as bringing its CSA or AP into force or amending/rescinding its SQP); awareness of the processes required to take these actions; the practical implications that may arise from them, such as new implementation duties or requirements; and the connection between effective safeguards, regulatory capabilities and access to peaceful uses.

The differing but equally effective impact of engaging with high-level partners (such as ministers and heads of government) on the one hand and working-level partners (such as regulators and diplomats) on the other was emphasised. These individuals approach nuclear issues with different perspectives and often different knowledge levels. As such, conducting outreach and capacity building activities with this in mind, as well as promoting interaction between the two groups on safeguards matters, has proven to be an effective strategy according to those interviewed for the study.

In this regard, the following recommendations were elaborated under the project.

15. The IAEA, States and groups of States should conduct more high-level safeguards outreach events at the General Conference where countries can share their experiences.
16. Strategies for outreach on safeguards should take a “top-down, bottom-up” approach, by which awareness is raised at the highest levels of government through direct outreach from the IAEA Director General, ministers and heads of State to their counterparts in the target country, as well as at the working level through capacity building conducted by the IAEA, States, groups of States and non-governmental organisations.
17. Further to “top-down, bottom-up” approaches, strategies should support internal exchanges between working-level staff and decision-makers. This could include designing capacity building activities such that both high- and working-level officials take part in training together with the explicit message that, while the high-level officials will have to take the decision to act on safeguards, working-level officials will be responsible for implementation. Such exchanges could also be facilitated by encouraging the highest level of participation in the General Conference.
18. Awareness raising is aided by the availability and dissemination of concise, easily digestible information across multiple languages about safeguards instruments themselves, the process of entry into force and general information, such as the difference between nuclear and other radioactive material, and the difference between power and non-power applications. This information could be produced by the IAEA, States, groups of States and/or non-governmental organisations in easy-to-access briefing packages, potentially tailored to the target country or region concerned. Potential vehicles for dissemination could be national safeguards champions, who could amplify this messaging internally and through relevant regional organisations.
19. Awareness should also be raised about the capacity building opportunities and educational resources already available. This includes the IAEA’s Safeguards Traineeship Programme, IAEA advisory services (such as the IAEA Safeguards and SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS), the IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for SSACs and SRAs (COMPASS), and the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR)), and opportunities offered by national governments (such as the US Department of Energy’s International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program (INSEP)) and non-governmental organisations (such as the VCDNP and VERTIC).

## **VII. Building Capacity for Implementation**

Over the course of this project, several States expressed the view that capacity building opportunities can serve as a catalyst for States to take action on safeguards. A primary need that this capacity building should fill is basic understanding of its obligations, such as what should be reported (noting the difference between nuclear and other radioactive material, for

example). Several States noted that concluding an AP can help the regulator do its job more effectively with both nuclear and other radioactive material, keep better track of all material, and implement more effective import/export regulations. Given that bringing an AP into force or amending/rescinding an SQP could involve changes in regulatory infrastructure and the need for further training for staff, funding on assistance for implementation is helpful. Finally, it was noted that it is not enough to support States only in effecting entry into force. There is a need for further outreach and capacity building activities that assist States with the continuing task of implementation.

Just as taking action across several disciplines at once can sustain momentum in a country concluding international instruments, interviewees noted that conducting national or regional trainings across many disciplines at once is effective in some cases. This is particularly true in cases where the office(s) dealing with nuclear issues is (are) staffed by a very small amount of individuals working across different files.

In this regard, it would be very important for those conducting outreach and capacity building activities to be “geographically sensitive”. The issue of small numbers of staff dealing with these issues means not only that a small group of experts are dealing with issues across multiple related disciplines. It also means that travel becomes difficult. In the case of Saint Lucia it was noted that getting authorisation for staff to take even a few days off to fly to Vienna for a training course is often difficult. While offers of such capacity building activities are highly valued, travelling across oceans takes time that small departments often do not have. As such, it was noted that the IAEA, States and groups of States should conduct more capacity building activities regionally, or even nationally, to increase attendance. Another challenge to increasing capacity is that developing countries and LDCs often have fewer foreign embassies from fewer countries located in their capitals. The result of this is that obtaining visas can be a more difficult and more expensive process. This can require in some cases individuals to travel from their capitals to another country to apply for the visa, stay there until the visa is approved, fly back home and only then fly to the location of the training.

Finally, interviewees cited problems with staff retention once training had been conducted. For example, Sri Lanka has been trying to develop the relevant legislation for entry into force of its AP since before it was approved by the IAEA Board in 2018. However, in 2019 the legal expert responsible for such legislation resigned and migrated to another country. This problem has been compounded by the inability since then to hire a replacement, due in part to financial constraints and the COVID-19 pandemic. When a replacement is appointed, the new legal expert will need to be trained in the nuclear field. Finding ways to assist countries in increasing staff retention was noted as a priority for further cooperation in safeguards capacity building.

Bearing in mind these insights, the project team and expert workshop made the following recommendations.

20. Strategies for capacity building activities should consider the value, on a case-by-case basis, of conducting training across disciplines when the departments and offices in countries that deal with safeguards also deal with other issues such as export controls, nuclear security, nuclear safety, border controls and/or customs regulations. In any event, geographical sensitivity should be considered when planning capacity building activities. This includes conducting more training on a national and regional basis, as well as preparing related budgets to account for difficulties in obtaining visas and planning flights.

21. As most of the recommendations contained in this report require financial backing, it would be useful for States that do not already conduct capacity building activities to begin doing so. They could do so either in cooperation with established bodies that conduct such outreach or independently, albeit still in a coordinated manner. Seeking non-traditional sources of funding is also an option, including private foundations and other sectors of government that do not provide such funding today. A third option would be for interested States and groups of States to pool funds through their Member State Support Programmes (MSSPs) or coordinate démarches with the aim of convincing governments that do not today support outreach and capacity building activities, to contribute funds.
22. Those conducting capacity building activities should bear in mind the importance of continuous training and review, especially in the establishment and maintenance of SSACs. To this end, the IAEA, States and groups of States should coordinate on which training courses have been conducted in which countries and ensure that support is being offered on an ongoing basis. States that require capacity building activities should not be shy in contacting those who have conducted training in the past to request follow-up visits. The IAEA's advisory services noted in the previous section are one option for this, as well as training conducted by governments and non-governmental organisations.
23. Capacity building for implementation consists not only of training, but also material support, such as software. During the workshop, it was remarked how helpful the further development of software such as the Regulatory Authority Information System (RAIS) and the Protocol Report 3 (PR3) had been and would be in the future.<sup>3</sup> Further efforts to make these and similar programmes easy to use, customisable to the country concerned, and in some cases able to serve as accounting for all nuclear and radioactive material in all uses in the country (rather than using two or three different databases) would be a continuous exercise to ensure that States are able to account and report effectively.
24. While much of this report has focused on outreach to and capacity building for experts located in-country, consideration should be given to ways in which country experts could spend extended time at the IAEA and then return to their capitals. This could include more funding for the IAEA's Safeguards Trainee Programme, but it could also include more temporary IAEA staff positions for developing countries with deficits in capacity to implement safeguards in their countries. Such positions (e.g. consultants or cost-free experts) would allow those who receive them an "inside view" of the Agency and serve as on-the-job training, while still contributing to the IAEA's day-to-day operations. For this to be effective, it would be important for such trainees to remain in their posts for a fixed period of time, and then return to their countries. Funding for these positions could come from interested governments or private foundations.

## VIII. Conclusions

For more than two decades, it has been recognised that universalisation of safeguards requires joint efforts between the IAEA Secretariat and its Member States, not just on outreach but on

---

<sup>3</sup> The RAIS software was "developed by the IAEA to assist Member States in managing their regulatory control programmes in accordance with IAEA Safety Standards and guides." For more information, see: <https://www.iaea.org/resources/software/rais>.

The PR3 software "is a computer software programme developed and provided by the IAEA, that facilitates the preparation by Member States of declarations pursuant to Article 2 and 3 of the Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements (Additional Protocol or AP). The system assists in the creation of declarations to the IAEA in electronic form." For more information, see: <https://www.iaea.org/topics/assistance-for-states/software-tools>.

capacity building. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, States Parties recommended that the IAEA Director General and IAEA Member States “consider ways and means, which could include a possible plan of action, to promote and facilitate conclusion and entry into force of [...] safeguards agreements and additional protocols, including, for example, specific measures to assist States with less experience in nuclear activities to implement legal requirements.”<sup>iv</sup> Later that year, the General Conference adopted its annual safeguards resolution, echoing that recommendation.<sup>v</sup> This plan of action was established on that basis and has been subject to regular updates ever since.

While Member States continue to praise the action plan in the General Conference resolution on the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system, relatively few bodies outside the IAEA conduct outreach and capacity building on safeguards. The efforts of those who conduct such activities are unquestionably laudable. While the VCDNP-VERTIC report in no way seeks to criticise or duplicate those efforts, it is time for innovative thinking on ways for the international community to work collaboratively to further enhance the impact of activities in safeguards outreach and capacity building.

It is particularly important to note in this regard the inherent link between safeguards and non-proliferation on the one hand and peaceful uses and development on the other. Funding for safeguards outreach and capacity building is not only a non-proliferation issue, but also a development issue. Bringing this to the forefront of the conversation in fora like the NPT review process, the IAEA General Conference and the UN General Assembly is crucial to the successful implementation of safeguards. Active efforts to bring attention to both key decision-makers in governments as well as the general public about the linkage between safeguards and peaceful uses is critical to all countries, but in particular to less developed countries.

It is in the best interest of all countries that safeguards be as strong and resilient as possible. For that to be the case, robust outreach and capacity building activities are required on a continuous basis and in a cooperative manner to include developed countries that do not already conduct such activities.

---

<sup>i</sup> Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, International Atomic Energy Agency. Available at: <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/21/09/sg-plan-of-action-2020-2021.pdf>.

<sup>ii</sup> Noah C. Mayhew, Ingrid Kirsten, Louis Reitmann and Alberto Muti, “Understanding States’ Experiences in Safeguards: Challenges to and Opportunities for Entry into Force and Implementation,” Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation and the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, 28 February 2023. Available at: <https://vcdnp.org/understanding-states-experiences-in-safeguards-challenges-to-and-opportunities-for-entry-into-force-and-implementation/>.

<sup>iii</sup> Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Article III.1 (as reproduced in INFCIRC/140). Available at: <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf>.

---

<sup>iv</sup> 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Report, Part I. Available at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt2000/final-documents>.

<sup>v</sup> IAEA, “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Protocol,” Resolution adopted on 22 September 2000 at the tenth plenary meeting, GC(44)/RES/19, 2000. Available at: [https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc44res-19\\_en.pdf](https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc44res-19_en.pdf).