Culture Analysis for International Nuclear Transport

According to Edgar H. Schein, cultures exist wherever groups, such as professional organizations, corporations, occupations, and nations, exist. Cultures also exist in international industries and organizations worldwide. For example, international nuclear transportation for exports and imports exists as a subculture within the nuclear macro-culture of a nation. Globally, about 15 million packages of radioactive material are transported each year around the world, many as imports and exports across national boundaries. According to the World Nuclear Association, a significant majority, about 95%, are radioactive consignments not related to nuclear power. These transported radioactive materials are used extensively in medicine, agriculture, research, manufacturing, and nondestructive testing, and for exploration to find minerals, according to the World Nuclear Transportation Institute. The IAEA has convened consultants’ meetings on nuclear safety culture and nuclear security culture and subsequently issued definitions, standards, and guidance for these two disciplines. However, the IAEA has not held a consultants’ meeting or issued guidance or standards on culture for international nuclear transportation. This paper briefly describes a culture analysis for international nuclear transport within national nuclear macro-cultures, based on our earlier work on occupational cultures that identified standards, definitions, and guidance issued by the IAEA for “nuclear safety culture” and “nuclear security culture.” This paper also applies Edgar H. Schein’s 3-level concept of culture analysis to international nuclear transportation culture. Conclusions and recommendations are provided, particularly for the IAEA to convene a consultants’ meeting to develop a working definition and issue guidance for international nuclear transportation culture. In a previous assessment of international interactions and interfaces for packaging and transport safety, security, and safeguards (3S), 25 topics were identified with potential conflicts and synergies, for which cultural bias or lack of familiarity with other nuclear cultures may be the root cause of potential conflicts in international interactions and interfaces among 3S. Recognizing and alleviating any cultural bias should help promote synergies and better achieve the goals for packaging and transportation of nuclear and other radioactive material.