Year
2000
Abstract
A comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force in a State, is the platform for safeguards at the level of the State as a whole. For these States, the Agency may draw conclusions and thereby provide credible assurances on the nondiversion of nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Addressing safeguards for the State as a whole imply the use of all safeguards measures available, as defined by a safeguards agreement or by an additional protocol. With the additional protocol, States will provide additional information on their nuclear sites, source material production, research activities and nuclear industrial capabilities. Together with increased access rights for the Agency, the basis has been created for approaching safeguards at the level of the State as a whole. A conclusion related to the non-diversion of nuclear material will remain fundamental, and a prerequisite for a broader conclusion on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Broad based analysis of all information available to the Agency is the major tool to obtain a full understanding of a State’s nuclear programme. Nuclear activities, including in their early stages of development, are associated with indicators to their existence, e. g. equipment, infrastructure or traces in the environment. Through information analysis the presence of these indicators may be revealed. The State evaluation is a continuous process performed in the IAEA headquarters, inextricably linked with inspection activities. Questions and inconsistencies related to a State’s declared programme generate follow-up activities including complementary access, to obtain clarification. Reaching conclusions on the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations is a process over time. A number of conditions are to be fulfilled before conclusions may be drawn for a State with respect to absence of diversion of nuclear material and of undeclared nuclear material and activities.