Contribution to “The Next Steps in International Safeguards” Summer 2009 Issue of JNMM

In addressing the next steps in international safeguards, a reasonable question to ask is whether further differentiation in how States are treated in safeguards implementation could be introduced without discrimination. What reorientation of safeguards implementation could be done and how? Safeguards implementation is largely determined by the basic safeguards technical parameters, which include significant quantities, detection probabilities, timeliness goals and nuclear material types. This paper explores several possible directions for the evolution of safeguards technical parameters to be applied in future state-level information-driven safeguards, focusing on NPT States under integrated safeguards while taking account of implementation under the other types of safeguards agreement. A reformulation of the technical objective of safeguards for NPT States under integrated safeguards is suggested. A modification of the timeliness goal for low enriched uranium is suggested for NPT States not under integrated safeguards and for non-NPT States. Redefinitions of natural uranium and plutonium nuclear material types are suggested for NPT States under integrated safeguards. The objective of these suggestions is to stimulate consideration of introducing further differentiation in safeguards implementation for different safeguards situations without discrimination.