Year
2021
Abstract
The calamitous events of recent times have had a significant impact on almost every facet of public safety in the United States, including nuclear plant security. In response to the public health emergency triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) curtailed baseline security inspections, suspended all force-on-force inspections at nuclear power plants, and granted exemptions to multiple security requirements to nuclear facilities, including those governing critical security officer training and requalification activities. The Department of Energy (DOE) also suspended force-on-force inspections at all its sites. Meanwhile, the recent civil unrest in the United States, and in particular the events leading up to the siege of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, have highlighted the domestic threat posed by heavily armed, right-wing extremists, some of whom have had military training. Of particular concern was the involvement of local law enforcement officials from across the United States, some of whom had openly advocated for armed revolt prior to the insurrection. The NRC’s decision last year to reduce the responsibility of nuclear plant licensees to protect certain radiological sabotage target sets by giving more credit for local law enforcement response appears particularly inadvisable given the agency’s lack of authority over the vetting of local law enforcement personnel for extremist views. Finally, the massive cyberattacks of the past year, including the Solar Winds and Microsoft Exchange server hacks, raise concerns about the ability of current procedures and technologies to successfully protect critical digital assets related to nuclear plant security functions from malevolent actors. Each of these challenges alone would pose grave concerns for the protection of nuclear facilities and materials; their potentially greater cumulative impact has not received adequate attention. This paper assesses the current situation and looks to the future.