Safeguards in Sweden: Challenges and Prospects

Sweden, together with the other European Union member states, signed the Additional Protocol on September 22,1998. After that, each state started the process of adapting to the situation expected after ratification. Sweden had been intensely involved in many activities that were of major importance for the development of the Strengthened Safeguards System (SSS) and the Additional Protocol (AP). This paper describes in short the nuclear history of Sweden and the development of the Swedish SSAC from its start in 1970 to the changes that are being finalized. During the early 1990s, Sweden took part in several tasks related to the 93+2 Program at the Agency. These tasks were mostly focused on testing different elements and activities to strengthen international safeguards. The result of these and other tasks performed by other member states of the Agency resulted in the SSS and the AP. Sweden has an interesting nuclear history as it, from the start, had a two line nuclear program, civil and military. During the early 1960s, Sweden was very active in promoting nonproliferation work. The idea was that if there were an international agreement against nuclear proliferation, then Sweden would leave the option to develop nuclear weapons. After signing the NPT, Sweden has joined most international nonproliferation agreements and treaties. Since 1995, Sweden, as a new member of the EU, is part of a regional safeguards control system, Euratom, which also affects the safeguards activities in Sweden. Swedish activities since signing the AP and ideas on how international and national safeguards can be carried out in Sweden in the future will be discussed in this paper.