Euratom Safeguards Office Views Integrated Safeguards in the European Union

Publication Date
Volume
29
Issue
4
Start Page
57
Author(s)
H. Nackaerts - Euratom Safeguards Office
W. Kloeckner - Euratom Safeguards Office
File Attachment
V-29_4.pdf7.37 MB
Abstract
The three Additional Protocols of the European Union were signed on September 22, 1998, and will enter into force when all signatories have ratified it. Experience has shown that the collection of information and the preparation of the initial declaration require a significant amount of work for the different operators and member states. But, more importantly, in order to guarantee successful implementation of the Additional Protocol, the IAEA will have to invest the necessary resources in evaluating all the information it receives and in performing complementary access where necessary. Only then can credible assurance be obtained that no clandestine activities are taking place in a state. We hope that in the European Union the IAEA will soon be able to draw conclusions regarding the absence of clandestine activities and that integrated safeguards can be implemented in the not too distant future. The different parties that form the safeguards community in the European Union, i.e. the IAEA, the Euratom Safeguards Office, the state authorities, and the operators, all have their own visions and expectations of what integrated safeguards should bring. The most important outcome of the whole exercise should be a strengthened IAEA safeguards system, which has the necessary resources available to focus on areas where a real proliferation risk exists. European operators are ready to invest resources in complying with all the measures of the Additional Protocol, knowing that the proliferation risk in the European Union is minimal, but they are prepared to do so as an example to states with higher risks. They, however, expect that with integrated safeguards the IAEA will reduce significantly the classical inspection effort in the European installations and make it commensurate with the very low proliferation risk that exists in this area of the world. The Euratom Safeguards Office believes that integrated safeguards could be the basis for the IAEA to make enhanced use of Euratom's Regional Safeguards System. The IAEA should fully exploit the activities performed and the results provided by the Euratom Safeguards Office thereby freeing the resources needed by the IAEA for focusing its activities on areas of real concern and for the implementation of the measures of the Additional Protocol. The Euratom Safeguards Office itself will also have to re-assess its role and scope in this new safeguards environment.
Additional File(s) in Volume
V-29_1.pdf9.31 MB
V-29_2.pdf4.57 MB
V-29_3.pdf8.16 MB
V-29_4.pdf7.37 MB