The Additional Protocol in the European Union as Preparation for Integrated Safeguards

The entry into force of the Additional Protocol (AP) in the European Union is a complex process because on the European side fourteen parties are signatories to the Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) AP (the thirteen NNWS of the EU plus the European Atomic Energy Community—usually known as Euratom). Matters were further complicated by the political wish to bring the APs relating to France and the UK into force at the same time as the NNWS AP, before the accession on May 1, 2004, of a further ten states to the EU. The application of the APs will present a number of challenges because of the extent, nature, and evolution of the nuclear fuel cycle in Europe. The European fuel cycle was established in the late 1950s at a time when many held the view that fission energy and later fusion energy would provide the community’s chief source of energy in the future. Since that time several European states have renounced the nuclear option, phasing out their nuclear research programs and reorienting their nuclear research centers toward non-nuclear purposes. The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was established in 1957 at the same time as the European Economic Community. Euratom had the task of creating the conditions for the establishment and growth of nuclear industries. Far-reaching responsibilities were given to Euratom in the areas of supply, safeguards, and ownership of nuclear materials but it was given little responsibility in relation to the control of the use of nuclear equipment. The European Commission is the body charged with execution of most of the controls and operational matters described in the Euratom Treaty. However, the AP concerns nuclear equipment and research as well as nuclear materials. Not all EU member states shared the commission’s view that the AP conferred new legal competencies upon the commission in relation to nuclear equipment. As a compromise, the AP for the thirteen NNWS allows member states that so wish to transfer to the European Commission the implementation of certain tasks which otherwise would be their responsibility. In parallel, and independent of the implementation of the AP in the EU, a root and branch review of the EU’s safeguards control regime is underway. Although the review has not been completed, it is clear that the regime will be considerably streamlined and may be reduced to a level comparable to that of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) integrated safeguards (IS)—sometime before the introduction of IS by the IAEA in the EU however. The IAEA already applies IS in some of the new member states and it is hoped that Euratom will gain valuable experience on IS from the new member states’ experiences.