Mailbox approaches for research reactors safeguards

This paper will explore potential new methods to strengthen the safeguards approach for research reactors. Interest in this topic was stimulated by the observation that most historical cases of non-compliance have involved research reactors. While the diversion from or misuse of research reactors was often discovered years after the fact and was usually a relatively small part in a broader pattern of non-compliance, these cases are an indication that the safeguards measures applied at these facilities have been insufficient for early detection and deterrence of such noncompliance. This paper reviews recent proposals for potential new safeguards methods designed to detect and deter undeclared activities at research reactors. These include the placement of hafnium coupons or wires in the reactor core to monitor reactor power and neutron fluence, expanded use of environmental and waste sampling, but focuses on exploring the concept of mailbox approaches. These approaches would use mailbox declarations for certain reactor operations, such as the movement of fuel, targets and associated containers, combined with random infrequent inspector verification. This paper will consider how such approaches could, in a non-intrusive manner, give IAEA inspectors greater understanding of normal reactor operations and help detect unusual operations that could serve as indicators of undeclared movement, irradiation, and processing of nuclear material targets.