Next-Generation Arms-Control Agreements based on Emerging Radiation Detection Technologies

Nuclear arms-control agreements subsist on the ability of interested parties to achieve verification of properties or processes at a sufficient level. How a sufficient level is defined is open-ended and presents a challenge in producing the overall agreement. Two main factors that define a party’s verification capabilities are the strategic outcomes desired from the agreement and the technical means to produce certainty in the observations or measurements. With radiation detection presenting one of the few means for non-destructive assay, the advent of new technologies in this field will increase the technical means available for a hypothetical agreement made in the future. If technical means allow for increased certainty in verification, different policy objectives not previously available will become possible. This research seeks to understand how new devices and methods for measuring and quantifying radiation signals affect the goals and outcomes for hypothetical arms-control agreements. Radiation detection use in current treaties such as New START and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty has been limited to simple neutron counting. More complex detection techniques have long existed that can quantify warhead attributes such as isotopic composition, fissile mass, and materials surrounding the warhead, but they have presented an unacceptable risk for compromising sensitive information. New detection development specifically in the arms-control field has made it a priority to factor in both authentication and certification considerations. With new technologies such as information barriers improving certification potential, the framework of hypothetical arms-control agreements using these technologies is examined to determine objectives that were not previously feasible. This work is significant because it examines verification means for treaty structures that may be required in the future if weapons reductions continue. With fewer weapons, arms-control treaties focused on counting warheads would be less important than determining the effectiveness of individual weapons. In considering a hypothetical framework that evaluates weapon effectiveness, technical means for verification must be well understood and studied in parallel to the policy effects of these agreements.