Application of the Canadian Deuterium Uranium Reactor: Toward the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement

Many have seen the suspension of the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) by the Russian Federation (RF) as the last nail in the coffin of good-faith nuclear weapons and materials reductions between the RF and the United States (US). The authors of this paper contend that the technology required for effective weapons grade (WG) Plutonium (Pu) materials disposition is not the monopoly of the two “superpowers”. Indeed, following the path first set out by the PMDA, the Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor is perfectly suitable for “burning” WG Pu once blended down into a suitable mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. This reactor is currently operating in multiple geographical locations and in multiple countries. The authors of this paper propose, somewhat analogous to the uranium fuel bank proposition, that two CANDU reactors, one in the East and the other in the West, under the auspices of the IAEA or other UN entity, be used to take MOX fuel generated from Russian and US WG Pu excess for defense needs, and dispose of this excess WG Pu under international observation/verification. The policy and technology impediments to this proposal are delineated, and it is noted that the policy impediments are probably the most severe. Nevertheless, the proposal demonstrates the capabilities of the Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in assisting the RF/US in a WG materials drawdown when the poor relations between those two countries currently inhibit progress towards (disarmament) Article VI of the NPT.