Mapping Nuclear Verification

Progress in nuclear arms control toward lower numbers of weapons will rely in parton the availability of viable treaty verification options that account for the entire life cycle of a weapon. The nature of these verification options depends on the direction that future reductions take (e.g. whether reductions emphasize warhead counting or fissile material balances) as well as the types of compromises that treaty negotiators are able to achieve in terms of balancing transparencyand security. As researchers and policymakers work to make these verification options available,there is a significant need for a conceptual map to facilitate orientation and prioritization, and to help explain the context in which particular technologies are relevant. This paper presents a fictional state model – called “Nu” – as a tool to illustrate various verification strategies in terms of both options and needs. Nu has been built to host a nuclear fuel cycle and weapon life cycle that is representative of most states that possess nuclear weapons, including the elements of production, assembly, deployment, disassembly, and disposition. Also illustrated in Nu are possible pre-existing verification regimes, e.g. IAEA safeguards, New START measures, and CTBT measures. As a tool for achieving a birds-eye view, a primary use for the Nu model is to identify and help address potential diversion pathways for fissile material or weapons through verification technologies and approaches,with varying levels of intrusiveness and scope. Example approaches presented in the paper address future arms control treaty objectives, including a next incremental bilateral treaty between Russia and the United States, as well as a state joining the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Each of the approaches offers strengths and weaknesses in terms of overall effectiveness, and each exhibits unique benefits and drawbacks from the perspectives of the hosts and inspectors. Readers should consider these approaches a starting point for discussion, as each can be broken down and recombined in numerous other configurations.