Year
2017
Abstract
Under the State-level concept for safeguards implementation, safeguards conclusions for a State are based on the evaluation of all safeguards-relevant information known about the State. This information includes that provided by the State itself, information generated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the conduct of safeguards activities in the field and at Headquarters, and all other safeguards-relevant information received or collected by the IAEA. During the conduct of verification activities and assessment of the associated information, the IAEA will observe conditions that require follow-up actions. Discrepancies and anomalies result from the analysis of information related to material accountancy verification; questions and inconsistencies result from analysis of received and collected information regarding nuclear activities within the State as a whole. Assessments of these questions, inconsistencies, discrepancies, and anomalies are conducted by the IAEA to determine if the observed condition resulted from a noncompliance with the safeguards agreement. Examples of noncompliance are diversion of nuclear material, misuse of safeguarded items, and the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities that would bring into question a conclusion that all nuclear material subject to the safeguards agreement remains in peaceful use. Unresolved findings from the processes for assessing discrepancies and anomalies and for assessing questions and inconsistencies are considered during the State evaluation process used in drawing safeguards conclusions. However, there are differences in the processes with respect to how similar types of information are assessed. This paper provides recommendations as to how the two processes could be unified to ensure more effective and efficient assessment of potential safeguards agreement noncompliance. In addition, the definition of an anomaly is reconsidered to address implementation of safeguards at the State level.