Assessment and Use of State-Specific Factors in the Implementation of Safeguards

The use of safeguards-relevant features and characteristics of a State in the implementation of safeguards has been a long-standing practice of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These ‘State-specific factors’ can affect the development of State-level safeguards approaches and the planning, conduct and evaluation of safeguards activities. The IAEA has identified six State-specific factors for systematic consideration and use in the application of the State-level concept. These factors are: (i) the type of safeguards agreement in force for the State and the nature of the safeguards conclusion drawn by the IAEA; (ii) the nuclear fuel cycle and related technical capabilities of the State; (iii) the technical capabilities of the State or regional system of accounting for and control of nuclear material; (iv) the ability of the IAEA to implement certain safeguards measures in the State; (v) the nature and scope of cooperation between the State and the IAEA in the implementation of safeguards; and (vi) the IAEA’s experience in implementing safeguards in the State. State-specific factors are not to be used for rating or grading a State’s safeguards credentials but to identify issues that could affect the effectiveness or efficiency of safeguards implementation for the State. IAEA reports and presentations on the State-level concept have described these factors and have given examples of information that could be considered in assessing each factor. This paper expands upon the IAEA examples and makes recommendations as to how State-specific factors could be assessed by the IAEA and how these factors might affect safeguards implementation. Although quantitative metrics were considered for assessing the State-specific factors, it was determined that the general State characteristics comprising the factors cannot be meaningfully quantified; however, performance indicators can be developed for some elements comprising some factors. The paper thus discusses ‘considerations’ that the IAEA should assess with respect to the State-specific factors (iii), (v), and (vi) and how those ‘considerations’ could affect safeguards implementation.