Neighborhood Nonproliferation: Building Regional Safeguards Institutions in Emerging Nuclear States

Year
2017
Author(s)
Justin A. Rizzi - Savannah River National Laboratory
Abstract
The nuclear nonproliferation regime has been guided by the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and guarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) independent verification techniques for decades. Yet, if the nonproliferation regime is to successfully endure, alternative safeguards processes must be explored beyond traditional IAEA methods. New conduits in verification are needed for the continued efficacy of nuclear safeguards as existing procedures become too costly and cumbersome, especially after considering the proposed growth of nuclear industry across the globe. The utilization of regional safeguards agencies for partial or joint safeguards verification stands as one pathway to greater effectiveness. While the IAEA must be able to verify a country’s nuclear safeguards independently, if a portion of this burden can be delegated to new regional institutions both efficiency and cost will benefit and an atmosphere of cooperation can develop. Indeed, two regional safeguards institutions already exist – the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC). However, new regional systems for accounting and control (RSACs) have not been introduced to the global nonproliferation regime in over 25 years. The potential advantage offered by regional safeguards institutions only multiplies when coupled with the founding of nuclear industry in emerging nuclear states. Such regional cooperation can lead to instilling safeguards norms and best practices as well as integrating nuclear materials accountability, control, and protection across multiple tiers of responsibility. This paper will introduce challenges faced by the nuclear nonproliferation regime and explore net benefits realized through RSACs, particularly when standing up such an organization in emerging nuclear states. Finally, the paper will conclude with an ‘Agreement Scaffold’ and recommendations for expanding the nuclear nonproliferation regime’s capabilities and extending IAEA efficiency through new regional cooperation.