Cyclus As a Synthetic Testbed of Systems-Level Diversion Signatures

Already the dominant source of clean energy, nuclear power is growing at a rapid pace. While beneficial to a world confronting climate change, the nuclear security and non-proliferation impacts of expanding nuclear power will become more consequential. As a result, it is imperative to develop credible methods to verify compliance with treaties that control fissile material production, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or a potential Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. As part of the Consortium for Verification Technology, the Cyclus fuel cycle simulator is being used as a testbed for the development of new technologies and analysis approaches to treaty verification. Cyclus is an agent-based, systems-level simulator that tracks discrete material flow through the entire fuel cycle, from mining through burnup in reactors to a repository, or alternatively through one or more iterations of reprocessing. A systems-level view facilitates the study of correlated signals from different facilities that combine to form identifiable signatures of clandestine activity. Cyclus also includes a region/institution/facility hierarchy that can incorporate the effects of tariffs and sanctions in regional or global contexts. Cyclus enables social- behavioral modeling of the interactions between individual facilities or regions. This paper presents the first use of Cyclus to simulate nuclear material diversion from the fuel cycle using a variety of contemporaneous signals: material flow, facility power consumption, effluent emissions (including geospatial distribution), event-logs. Multiple signal modalities can be analyzed in concert using anomaly detection techniques to identify signatures of material diversion or other signatures of clandestine nuclear weapons development. The Cyclus testbed can then be used to examine treaty verification techniques and inspection regimens to to inform their sensitivity and limitations.Already the dominant source of clean energy, nuclear power is growing at a rapid pace. While beneficial to a world confronting climate change, the nuclear security and non-proliferation impacts of expanding nuclear power will become more consequential. As a result, it is imperative to develop credible methods to verify compliance with treaties that control fissile material production, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or a potential Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. As part of the Consortium for Verification Technology, the Cyclus fuel cycle simulator is being used as a testbed for the development of new technologies and analysis approaches to treaty verification. Cyclus is an agent-based, systems-level simulator that tracks discrete material flow through the entire fuel cycle, from mining through burnup in reactors to a repository, or alternatively through one or more iterations of reprocessing. A systems-level view facilitates the study of correlated signals from different facilities that combine to form identifiable signatures of clandestine activity. Cyclus also includes a region/institution/facility hierarchy that can incorporate the effects of tariffs and sanctions in regional or global contexts. Cyclus enables social- behavioral modeling of the interactions between individual facilities or regions. This paper presents the first use of Cyclus to simulate nuclear material diversion from the fuel cycle using a variety of contemporaneous signals: material flow, facility power consumption, effluent emissions (including geospatial distribution), event-logs. Multiple signal modalities can be analyzed in concert using anomaly detection techniques to identify signatures of material diversion or other signatures of clandestine nuclear weapons development. The Cyclus testbed can then be used to examine treaty verification techniques and inspection regimens to to inform their sensitivity and limitations.