Year
2016
Abstract
This research investigates a broad scope of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) technologies that could improve current safeguards practices once UAVs are deemed to be mature enough for introduction within the IAEA's arsenal of verification tools. As a whole, UAVs are extremely diverse machines that can provide powerful information to inspectors in safeguards-type applications. With the large variety of UAV technologies currently available, UAV designers have the ability to build vehicles specifically tailored to particular missions. UAV technologies that could be useful to the IAEA include: chemical and radiological mapping, LiDAR and photogrammetry mapping, and sample collection systems. Equipping detection, mapping and sample collection systems onto UAVs gives these tools the advantage of travelling anywhere in the air. Once attached to UAVs, inspection tools no longer have to be constrained by the physical limitations of a group of inspectors. UAVs are particularly useful for collecting information in areas that are too dangerous or difficult for inspectors to reach. This includes areas such as rooftops, degraded buildings, hazardous terrains, and anywhere with unknown amounts of contamination. In addition to being able to function in hazardous environments, UAVs have the robotic persistence to complete long, repetitive tasks in a consistent manner. This work reviews UAV technologies currently being used in other fields (such as industrial inspection and environmental monitoring) and recommends ways that these UAV technologies can be adapted to safeguards purposes. Possible safeguards tasks for UAVs include: flying to hard-to- reach places to collect environmental samples; tracking radiation levels around mines and mills with aerial radiation mapping; flying inside nuclear facilities to pinpoint locations of contamination leaks; and taking “bird’s eye” aerial images of rooftops and dry cask storage areas. These possible uses for UAVs could provide additional information to safeguards inspectors and facilitate decision making processes - all without putting inspectors at any additional health or safety risks. (The authors thank the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NA-24) for the support given to enable this work.)