Re-evaluating Self-Protection Levels in a New Security Environment

Changes in the international threat environment coupled with the vulnerability of nuclear reactors worldwide raises significant security concerns about the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear sites. Non-state actor groups appear both more willing and more capable of circumventing international protective regimes, and a shocking number of reactors sites still present susceptible targets for nuclear terrorism. Therefore, policymakers must pinpoint and address possible weaknesses in physical protection regimes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uses a sliding scale of physical protection recommendations based on material attractiveness (i.e. suitability for nuclear weapons). This categorization system relies, in part, on the self-protecting character of radioactive materials. Material is considered self-protecting if its radiation levels can incapacitate someone before he/she commits a ‘malicious act,’ such as theft, diversion or sabotage. Based on this theory, the categorization system assigns self-protecting materials a lower attractiveness value than normal, thus lowering the standard of physical protection. Given the changes in the international environment surrounding nuclear materials, do the established self-protection security benefits sufficiently account for the downgrade in physical protection; do they result in safe attractive materials or unsafe attractive materials? This study evaluates the strength of the IAEA standard through a review of the current physical protection recommendations and a literature review of scientific articles on the health effects of radiation exposure. Reviewing current physical protection standards and security failures establishes that groups can divert, steal or sabotage material within approximately one to three hours. Examining the symptoms of radiation exposure determines that the current IAEA self- protection standard of 1 Gy/hour does not incapacitate within this one to three hour window. This means the current standard of self-protection is insufficient to impede determined groups. Using data on expected radiation symptoms after exposure, this study determines that 10 Gy/hour is a more secure standard. The IAEA should revise its self-protection definition to reflect this consideration.