PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE NEW START TREATY

The New START Treaty is now about halfway through its nominal lifetime of ten years. This is a good opportunity to consider how implementation is proceeding, especially in view of the strained status of U.S.-Russian relations in general. Much attention has been given to U.S. charges of Russian violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the damage that has been done to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty by Russian policies. In spite of U.S. offers of further bilateral reductions in both strategic and tactical offensive nuclear weapons, near-term progress seems unlikely in this area. This is due in part to differing perceptions of the role of other weapon systems, such as ballistic missile defense, longrange precision-guided conventional systems and third-country forces. Another reason for pessimism is the unexpected difficulty encountered in securing consent to ratification of New START itself in the U.S. Senate. There have been some recent successful U.S.-Russian interactions in multilateral arms control. A key example would be in negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. In addition, the U.S. and Russia generally found themselves on the same side in the contentious 2015 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). With this mixed record, the New START Treaty stands as a conspicuous bright spot. Building on the success of the START I Treaty, which expired in 2009, the sides have shown a determination to implement successfully the further reductions and innovative verification arrangements of New START. Each side is under, or close to, the three central limits required by the Treaty. A huge number of notifications have been exchanged, giving each side a clear picture of the status of relevant forces. Each side is conducting successfully the 18 on-site inspections allowed each year. What is not clear is what the next steps after New START should be and when these might realistically be expected. Although much of the world is pressing for more rapid progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, it is difficult to see clearly the path ahead.