Definition and Evaluation of Generic Threat Statements

Since 1988, DOE field offices have been under increasing pressure to consider the \"full\" threat spectrum in evaluations of facilities in which special nuclear material is stored or processed. The generic threat guidance provides only a broad framework of adversary threats and malevolent events to be considered in security evaluations. This has led to much confusion and inefficiency in development of vulnerability assessments (VA's) and has been, in the opinion of the authors, one of the major roadblocks in the Master Safeguards and Security Agreement (MSSA) process. A structured approach to defining adversary types, combinations and characteristics is needed. A procedure to logically and comprehensively define the adversary/malevolent event scenarios requiring evaluation is also needed. The benefits of such an approach would include a standardized threat definition for all facilities within a site; a clear path forward for site VA practitioners; and a structured and logical presentation of the VA procedure and results for review and verification by DOE-HQ groups. This paper, within the constraints of classification restrictions, discusses expansion of the generic threat guidance to arrive at a comprehensive and realistic spectrum of adversaries to be considered in the VA. The paper reviews the range of characteristics to be considered for each adversary and proposes a preapproval process to obtain field office and HQ concurrence with the site-specific threat basis. Finally, the paper discusses evaluation procedures and decision rules to structure the development and assessment of adversary/malevolent event scenarios.