IMPLICATIONS OF IAEA POLICY PAPER 21 FOR THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

With the publication of Policy Paper 21 in December 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) clarified that certain chemical forms of uranium should be considered nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment that, in accordance with paragraph 34(c) of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), should be subject to nuclear material accountancy and regular access (i.e. some uranium ore concentrates and uranium-bearing solutions that occur prior to the product stage of a uranium conversion plant). Although intended to clarify the obligations of the IAEA and state regulatory authorities, implementation of Policy Paper 21 may create new challenges for industry and facility operators and new verification responsibilities for the IAEA. Countries with uranium mills and ore concentration plants that produce material that meets the purity requirements defined in Policy Paper 21 will have to have the necessary domestic regulatory infrastructure and processes to meet additional reporting requirements to the IAEA. The IAEA will have to decide what level of verification effort will be devoted to uranium mills and ore concentration plants that produce material required to be safeguarded and weigh the financial and organizational implications of this additional effort in light of current resource and personnel constraints as well as the transition to State-level safeguards approaches.