Elimination of HEU use for Naval Propulsion: Moving Forward or Dead in the Water?

Year
2015
Author(s)
George M. Moore - Scientist-in-Residence, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies
Abstract
Elimination of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) stockpiles has long been a goal of nonproliferation advocates. Naval propulsion reactors account for the largest non-weapons use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the world. The largest stores of naval propulsion fuel are in the United States, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom. Using low-enriched uranium (LEU) for naval propulsion reactors, as is currently done in France and China, would allow a significant reduction in non-weapons stocks of HEU and would have significant positive impacts on global nonproliferation and counterterrorism efforts. In 2014 the U.S. Navy responded to a Congressional request to update its 1995 Report to Congress on the potential for using LEU in submarines and aircraft carriers. While the 1995 Report is universally negative with regard to conversion to LEU, the 2014 Report may indicate that the Navy might be willing to support further studies of LEU use. While an optimist might see that as a change to the Navy’s adamant desire to continue to use HEU in naval reactors, a pessimist would view the Navy’s statements as a reflection of the desire to disingenuously use LEU studies to maintain the health of the service's research and development programs. The paper and presentation review the current worldwide situation and attempt to define the Navy’s current position. It will also address what some describe as the NPT/Safeguards “loophole” than could allow marginally safeguarded HEU use in naval propulsion programs in Non-Weapons NPT states.