Nuclear Security Risk Evaluation Using Adversary Pathway Analysis Methodology for an Insider-Outsider Collusion Scenario

Security preparedness went through several changes since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. Simultaneously there are growing concerns of terrorists attacking a nuclear facility for sabotage and for special nuclear material theft to meet their goals and ideologies. The destruction of critical nuclear infrastructure would have a devastating effect. A Physical Protection System (PPS) is deployed at a facility to prevent the loss of valuable assets. The effectiveness of a PPS is evaluated and the adversary’s paths to breach the PPS are analyzed to minimize the success of a credible threat posed by adversaries. A modified pathway analysis methodology is presented here for an adversary attack involving insiders working in collusion with outside adversaries. The goal was to generate a methodology that could be used to accurately estimate the associated nuclear security risk including the effect of nuclear security culture to detect and mitigate insider threats. To test the assessment methodology, a typical power reactor complex was used as a hypothetical case study. Estimation of the risk can be made using the equation: R = PA*(1-PI*PN)*C, where PA is the probability of attack along a path, PI is the probability of interruption of the adversary, PN is the probability of neutralization of the adversary and C is the consequence from the adversary’s success. An adversary path is composed of a series of adversary actions to overcome the PPS. Each action has a delay time (tD) which depends on the capabilities of the adversary and delay element in the path of the adversary and a detection probability (PD) which can occur at several locations along the path. The values of PD and tD not only depend on the detection and delay element along the adversary’s path but also on the adversary’s capabilities. The analysis philosophy is to find out all the possible adversary paths and then to determine the possible effects on the risk quantification through paths involving insiders working in collusion with outsiders in nuclear power plant complex.