New Thoughts on Protecting Nuclear Materials and Facilities: A Systems-Theoretic Framework for Security

Current approaches to nuclear security are best described by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s guidance to develop ‘risk-based physical protection systems and measures’ intended to deter, detect, delay, respond and (if necessary) mitigate malicious acts regarding nuclear materials. These approaches can produce elegantly designed physical protections systems that may be limited by untenable assumptions (for mathematical tractability) or well stated descriptions of desired behaviors that rely on vague, imprecise notions of security-improving characteristics. More to the point, noted nuclear security culture expert Dr. Igor Khripunov notes a lack of guidance on ‘assessing the human factor in detection, delay and response’ in current approaches.This conference paper summarizes recent research exploring and developing a framework that evaluates nuclear security performance in terms of system-level interactions between the technical nuclear security systems and human/organizational behaviors. Here, technical systems encompasses the physical protection system (PPS), the physical infrastructure on which it sits and is described by the traditional system effectiveness measures (e.g., PE). Similarly, human/organizational behaviors include formal (e.g., official roles and responsibilities) and informal aspects (e.g., networks of information flow and internal power dynamics) that are manifested in security procedures and described as quality indicators of security performance. The result is a new approach called the Systems-Theoretic Framework for Security (STFS).STFS uses the security task completion construct to explain that the adequate completion of security tasks, defined as behavioral performance requirement derived from the PPS design, is required to achieve desired levels of security performance. Further, STFS aids in identifying where organizational influences on interactions between PPS and human/organizational behaviors may impact security task completion and the ability to achieve desired performance levels. This conference paper introduces the theoretical logic underlying and empirical support for STFS. It then discusses some implications and recommendations related to this new approach to protecting nuclear materials and facilities. SAND2018-0829 A.