Drafting a Verification System to Detect Clandestine Reprocessing in the Middle East

Abstract: This work examines the feasibility of a regional verification system to detect undeclared but active reprocessing plants in the Middle East. Such a verification system could be an important building block in a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East. Nuclear reprocessing plants are technically detectable via their krypton-85 emissions. These emissions allow for remote detection through environmental sampling of air downwind from such a facility. A freshly released plume of krypton-85 gets dispersed with the prevailing winds and mixed with air masses. With increased transport time and distance, the concentration decreases and at some point becomes undetectable against the krypton-85 background. This background has built up from ongoing civilian and military reprocessing since 1945. When looking for emissions from clandestine reprocessing plants multiple air samples have to be taken to effectively cover a certain area. In this assessment, atmospheric transport modeling based on real meteorological data is applied to determine the necessary number of samples that have to be taken over the target region to detect various plutonium production rates. This is used as a basis for a verification system that could be used in the context of an international treaty that prohibits the separation of plutonium in the Middle East.