HOW TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS: MOVING FORWARD WITH THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

This paper argues that one way to strengthen international safeguards would be to ensure the signature of the Additional Protocol (AP) by all IAEA member states. Events in the early 1990s, including the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the discovery of Iraq?s clandestine attempted nuclear weapons program, South Africa?s nuclear rollback, and the nuclear crisis unfolding in the DPRK, prompted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to request recommendations on strengthened and more efficient safeguards in order to extend the classical safeguards system. As a result, the model protocol – the IAEA Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540) – was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1997. The AP provides better tools to carry out inspections on a more routine basis and in a less confrontational manner since it provides access rights to suspect locations at short notice, additional information and verification on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, and the use of environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities. Currently, 139 countries have signed the AP. However, there are a number of countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Venezuela, and Burma that have not yet signed the AP. The paper outlines possible reasons for why these countries have yet to sign the AP and will offer recommendations that could increase the chances that hold-outs will sign the AP, thereby moving forward the IAEA?s desire to strengthen international safeguards.