Hardware Authentication - Considerations and Approaches

If the data used for verification of arms control treaties, for transparency of nuclear warhead dismantlement activities, or for international safeguards is to be trusted, one must first be assured that the equipment generating that data can be trusted. Assurance that an adversary has not altered the equipment to give accurate readings during calibration and testing while giving false information during actual use is essential to the verification of compliance to the agreement being monitored. This paper discusses the motivations for authenticating the equipment, approaches for establishing trust when equipment is first presented for authentication and techniques for re- establishing trust in the equipment if a tampering event is suspected. Authentication is especially difficult for equipment to be used in warhead dismantlement transparency activities. This equipment will most likely be supplied by the host and then must be authenticated by the inspecting party before use. This makes authentication extremely difficult, and the problem is further complicated by restrictions placed on the authentication activities by the host due to security and safety considerations at the facility. Methods for coping with these difficulties are also discussed.