A study on the legal framework for the nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security

Safeguards, export control and physical protection are different from safety in the nature and need to be treated separately. When we look at the legal framework for these three sectors in each country, those of nuclear-weapon states are different from those of non nuclear weapon states. The United States has Nuclear Non-proliferation Act. It regulates safeguards, export control and physical protection. But, while the regulations on the nuclear nonproliferation and security have major implications in the non-nuclear weapon states with many nuclear facilities, they are mixed with those on the safety without being treated separately. For example, Japan does not have the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. She has ‘the Atomic Energy Basic Law’ and 'the Act on the regulations of the nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors', instead. Each chapter of this Act is organized by the nuclear fuel cycle operators. And it regulates the operators mainly from the point of view of ensuring safety. The regulations on the physical protection are sandwiched in between them. Korea has the Atomic Energy Act and Nuclear Safety Act, according to the IAEA recommendation that each party shall ensure an effective separation between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body concerned with the promotion. Additionally she has the 'Act on Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency'. Under current frame, there is no problem to implement CSA, AP, CPPNM, NSG guidelines. However, it can give the impression that nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security are incidental to the safety and affect their independence of work. So, I suggest separate legislation encompassing safeguards, export control and nuclear security.