Future Directions for Arms Control Verification Technologies

The U.S. Department of EnHUJ\\¶V??1DWLRQDO??1XFOHDU??6HFXULW\\??$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ??2IILFH??RI?? Dismantlement and Transparency (DOE/NNSA/ODT) provides direction and funding for the applied development and assessment of effective arms control verification technologies and capabilities for monitoring the reduction and dismantlement of nuclear weapons, weapon components, and associated equipment in the United States and other countries. Nuclear weapon reduction and limitation agreements to date have focused on limiting nuclear weapon delivery systems and attributed or deployed warheads. However, as strategic nuclear forces continue to draw down, it is likely that future arms control treaties will address monitoring deployed and stockpiled nuclear weapons, and eventually, the dismantlement of these nuclear weapons into weapon components and material for disposition. This type of monitoring and verification will rely much more on advanced technology and capabilities. To meet these future needs, Office of Dismantlement and Transparency is evaluating and supporting the development of a number of technologies, which we believe will become more applicable and necessary with each successive nuclear weapon reduction initiative. This work includes the applied development of passive and active radiation measurement systems to determine the presence of nuclear weapons and/or materials, as well as new analysis software to make the best possible use of the data obtained from these measurements. Since these radiation measurement systems are by their very nature intrusive, they must have a certifiable information barrier as well as be able to be authenticated. Finally, arms control verification technologies are needed to establish and maintain continuity of knowledge of for weapons in storage and undergoing dismantlement, to include robust tamper-indicating devices (TID) and tamper-indicating enclosures (TIEs). These technologies may be applied in the near term to enhance confidence and verification of nuclear weapon reductions, and will be required in the longer term as verification requirements become even more demanding.