Year
2011
Abstract
In 2009, the Belgian federal government asked the OECD to nominate a commission to assess on its technical aspects the design of MYRRHA, an Accelerator Driven System based on a PbBi target and cooling with 30-35% MOX fuel. In the framework of this international review, the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK•CEN was asked to provide also an assessment of the proliferation risks of MYRRHA. An assessment was made of the proliferation risks of MYRRHA in comparison with the BR2 MTR, an existing research reactor at SCK•CEN. The assessment was based on the TOPS (Technological Opportunities to Increase the Resistance of Global Civilian Nuclear Power Systems) Barrier Analysis Method and concluded that MYRRHA is more vulnerable for State-supported diversion of nuclear material, while BR2 is more vulnerable for diversion by non-State actors. In this paper we apply the PR&PP methodology, developed by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Evaluation Methodology Working Group of the GEN IV International Forum. The results of the PR&PP methodology are then compared with the results obtained with the TOPS method. The interest in applying PR&PP lies in that it provides complementary information to TOPS. The TOPS methodology evaluates a larger number parameters, but at a generic system level. The PR&PP considers less parameters, but the system is analyzed in more detail, which provides better insight in the vulnerability of the different diversion pathways. Based on the analysis recommendations will be developed to improve the safeguards approach for an ADS facility. The significance of this work is strengthened by the fact that the results apply not only to MYRRHA, but can be partly extended to other GEN IV reactor concepts that are based on fast reactor technology.