Game Theoretical Perspectives for Diversion Path Analysis

Diversion Path Analysis in the context of Nuclear Material Safeguards is the identification and evaluation of all paths along which nuclear material can be diverted from the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle for military purposes or purposes unknown. Obviously such an analysis must be strategic in nature, giving particular attention those diversion paths which are most promising from the diverter's point of view. This implies, in turn, the use of game theoretical concepts, a fact which has been long recognized but which has enjoyed renewed interest in recent years by more and more analysts. This paper presents a general framework for game theoretical approaches to diversion path analysis. Starting with very simple payoffs to the Inspectorate and the State, it is shown how the problem can be formulated and solved in terms of Game Theory. The inclusion of additional complicating aspects in the analysis, such as false alarm and detection probabilities as well as conversion times is examined and partial solutions are presented, in particular the conditions under which the State is deterred from illegal behavior. A discussion of the usefulness of this kind of analyses concludes the paper.