Year
2012
Abstract
Over the last decade, efforts by the safeguards community, including inspectorates, governments, operators and owners of centrifuge facilities, have given rise to new possibilities for safeguards approaches in enrichment plants. Many of these efforts have involved development of new instrumentation to measure uranium mass and uranium-235 enrichment and inspection schemes using unannounced and random site inspections. We have chosen select diversion scenarios and put together a reasonable system of safeguards equipment and safeguards predicting the probability of detection of diversion in the chosen safeguards approaches. We have added instrumentation from previous students and used the weighted least squares method to combine the measurement data taken from multiple instruments. This method then gave us a quantitative measure of the effect of redundancy instrumentation, cross verification of operator instrumentation by inspector instrumentation, and the effects of failures or anomalous readings on verification data. Armed with these results we were able to quantify the technical cost benefit of the addition of certain instrument suites and show the promise of these new systems. Our analysis also showed the robustness of the approach to any possible instrument failures or anomalies.