Motivations Behind Nuclear Weapons Programs: The North Korean Case

On October 9, 2006 North Korea tested a nuclear explosive device for the first time. This test marked the failure of longstanding bilateral and multilateral negotiation processes in spite of all efforts of the international community to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. The test undermined the steady international nonproliferation regime and seriously challenged security in the area. North Korea, by pursuing nuclear weapons, also joined the list of “rogue states,” and was labeled as “axis of evil” state by the Bush administration almost as soon as the administration came into power. Moreover, its nuclear test forced the UN Security Council to apply a broad range of sanctions against it. However, North Korea still manipulates its nuclear program, caucusing grave international concern by using it as a bargaining chip. Recently it conducted a missile test (April 24, 2009) and a month later conducted the second nuclear test (May 25, 2009). The nuclear test was characterized by experts as a powerful underground nuclear test.1 What was the motivation behind the North Korean nuclear program in general and the second nuclear test in particular? To answer this question this paper first considers the history of motivations behind nuclear programs of de-facto and de-jure nuclear states, then it examines the history of the North Korean nuclear program and analyzes the motivations behind it.