Detecting Undeclared Reprocessing and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants: The State of Play and Prospects

In every State under comprehensive safeguards, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards faces the challenge of verifying the absence of undeclared nuclear facilities. Reaching a conclusion on the absence of undeclared nuclear sites can be considered as inherently difficult, as doing so involves proving a negative general statement. In addition, the weak physical signatures of gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) and reprocessing facilities limit the effectiveness of remote sensing techniques, making this task particularly difficult. Nevertheless, recent developments in commercial satellite imagery may bolster the capabilities of the IAEA for detecting undeclared nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Likewise, the development of atom trap trace analysis could enhance wide-area environmental sampling capabilities, and the availability of open-source information and analysis tools continues to grow at a fast rate. This paper will discuss how these new capabilities might be applied to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA’s efforts to detect undeclared GCEPs and reprocessing facilities. These potential benefits will be evaluated along with implementation and legal approaches that could also provide evidence of undeclared sites, while discussing the roles that these technologies and approaches could play within the IAEA safeguards system as a whole.