Year
2009
Abstract
A concept for an international nuclear fuel cycle system, involving multi-national control of fuel-cycle facilities, reliable fresh fuel supply, spent fuel management, and peaceful plutonium utilization, is proposed by the Non-proliferation Study Committee at the University of Tokyo. The proposed international fuel cycle system includes both the front-end and back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, i.e., fuel supply (enrichment and fuel fabrication), spent fuel storage, reprocessing, MOX fuel fabrication, and High Level Waste (HLW) repository. The system consists of a network of fuel cycle facilities operated by companies/consortia, located in respective countries (host countries), and offering fuel cycle services to nuclear utilities/companies in user countries. The host countries of the consortia should be responsible for the 3S (fundamentals of safety, security and safeguards) of their fuel cycle facilities, and for preventing the spread of sensitive fuel cycle technologies to user countries without such technologies. Fuel cycle services provided by the consortia in the international (or regional) framework should be commercially competitive. Regional safeguards verification is performed by the multilateral member countries (Regional System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material; RSAC), complementing the international Safeguards effort which would be provided by IAEA. Nuclear weapon country (NWC) as well as non-nuclear weapon country (NNWC) when participating in the international framework must be under the same system of Safeguards. For purpose of equality, a country can choose its own fuel cycle option. It also has its right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Article IV of NPT) although the country if develops sensitive fuel-cycle technologies should meet the conditions/prerequisites developed by the framework. Therefore, a country can join the framework first as a user country but later can become a fuel cycle country if it can fulfill the conditions/prerequisites established by the framework. The international framework would facilitate partnerships among member countries such that a service of taking back/taking away the spent fuels can be offered to user countries, especially those located in less stable regions. The “take-back” spent fuel can be stored at centralized facilities in host country(ies) offering such service, and managed by the international or regional framework system under multi-national control for an interim period. Preferably, the host country(ies) offering such storage service would be the NWC as there is less suspicion forthe NWCs to divert or misuse the spent fuel for weapons purposes. However, the framework would accept other NNWCs, such as the major uranium producing countries which are capable and willing to offer such storage services for other needed countries. Direct disposal of spent fuels is not considered by the framework because of the long-term effective utilization of nuclear fuels (recovered U and Pu), proliferation concerns of spent fuels (due to the imbedded Pu), and environmental burden. Separated Pu would be utilized for peaceful, effective, and efficient use of nuclear energy, with the aim to prevent unnecessary Pu accumulation. If there is an excess of separated Pu inventory in a NNWC, the framework would facilitate the transfer of the excess Pu inventory (i.e., unplanned for use) to the NWCs willing to take such inventory and to compensate with alternative fuel (such as LEU). The values of plutonium should be properly compensated for by alternative energy resources or economic support. The transferred Pu should be utilized only for the peaceful purpose of nuclear energy under strict control of IAEA Safeguards. Individual country should be responsible for disposal of its own HLW. The international framework would encourage member countries to facilitate regional or international repository(ies) for the final disposal of radioactive wastes. If such international framework system can be realized, it is expected that the proliferation risks would be reduced and the burden of safeguards requirements can be lessened in the expansion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.