Year
2000
Abstract
Unattended monitoring systems can reduce the need for on-site human presence while still assuring the proper safeguardso f nuclear material. However, such systems generatlea rge quantities of raw sensor data that then have to be related to known or declareda ctivities and material accountancy records. We previously described a concept and technical approach to analyzing this data, based on the use of finite-state machine process models. [ 11 We have now applied this technique to the analysis of sensor data from unattended monitoring systemast two facilities: an integration laboratory used to simulate material handling facilitiiens the DOE complex and a bunker used to simulate semi-static storagoef high-value assets. The analysis of the integration laboratory data focused on verifying the occurrence of declared activities, even in the presence of “noise” due to people walkinga round the facility. The analysis of the bunker data considered questions of data integrity and system integrity including how to modify process analysis results based on the qualityo f the data. The paper will describe the modelus sed to perform the analyses and the results obtained. We will also discuss how additional data could strengthen the conclusions and discuss the implications for monitoring systemde sign.