Year
2000
Abstract
Physical protection evolution includes the theft of special nuclear material (SNM) and sabotage of spent fuel. Historically, physical protection considered only the theft of SNM, and sabotage was not considered an issue because of insufficient fission products to achieve releases approaching or exceeding 10 CFR Part 100 site-specific limits. Later, through NRC policy decisions, theft was discarded because of the incredible effort it would take to separate SNM from spent fuel and this effort was considered beyond the ability of a sub-national group. At about the same time 10 CFR Part 72 was promulgated by the NRC and established a safety goal of 5-rem at the site boundary. Physical protection was reoriented to deal with that limit. The 5-rem goal became the new protection or sabotage limit. Questions remain of the viability of achieving even this limit and practical full-scale tests have yet to be conducted. The Government and industry seem to have conflicting approaches to the physical protection of spent power reactor fuel. The Department of Energy and the NRC look the spent fuel regulation (10 CFR 73.51) differently, because of the spent fuel standard.