Year
2011
Abstract
Public Law 109-364 directed the Secretary of Energy to develop a plan for transformation of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex to achieve a responsive infrastructure by 2030. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) must transform the Nuclear Weapons Complex to support the national security, enhance efficiency, while maintaining the safety and reliability the Nation’s weapons arsenal. The Department of Energy (DOE), and NNSA in partnership with the Department of Defense (DOD), ensures the United States has a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. The NNSA nuclear weapons complex of the future must be agile and responsive to potential changes in the national security environment. Confidence would be based on the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the research and development tools that come with it, which continue to provide a fuller understanding of nuclear weapons phenomena. This transformed infrastructure would be smaller, more efficient, and designed to meet safety and security needs. The NNSA developed a strategy in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Nuclear Weapons Council to achieve a more responsive infrastructure. This strategy is articulated in NNSA’s Complex 2030: An Infrastructure Planning Scenario for a Nuclear Weapons Complex Able to Meet the Threats of the 21st Century, released on October 23, 2006. Vital to the Complex 2030 transformation strategy is the necessity to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile, while capabilities would be consolidated and unnecessary duplication eliminated. The Stockpile Stewardship Program would remain one of the principle missions of the NNSA national laboratories. The number of sites with large quantities of special nuclear materials (e.g. plutonium and uranium) would be minimized as soon as possible. Complex 2030 would function in a more cost-effective manner while maintaining compliance with safety and security requirements. The original milestone of the Complex 2030 plan for removing Category I/II quantities of special nuclear materials from NNSA national laboratories, not engaged in pit manufacturing, had a goal of 2014. LLNL was preparing to release their plan for the 2014 deadline, when the Department of Energy requested acceleration of the de-inventory efforts. LLNL responded with a revised plan, Special Nuclear Materials FY2012 Security Category I/II De-inventory Plan that addressed NNSA’s desire for accelerated transformation for LLNL. The Plan describes high-level elements of the De-inventory Project and summarizes LLNL’s efforts to de-inventory Security Category I/II amounts of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) from the Plutonium Facility by the end of FY2012. As long as the United States relies on a nuclear deterrent to ensure the security of itself and its allies, there are certain capabilities that must be maintained to ensure that nuclear weapons are safe, secure, and reliable. In addition, the NNSA must maintain a range of capabilities to have an agile and responsive infrastructure. NNSA is determined to transform the Nuclear Weapons Complex consistent with Complex 2030 Plan through the existing program and line management structure. This eliminates counterproductive, near-term disruptions from either a major re- structuring of the NNSA weapons program or creation of a separate, competing transformation program. NNSA considers the Complex 2030 planning scenario as the best approach to balance near- and long-term commitments to the stockpile, transform the Complex, and achieve long- term cost savings. NNSA estimates the footprint of the current Complex funded by the Weapons Activities Account could be reduced by one-quarter to as much as one-third, if all of the Complex 2030 actions are implemented. To date LLNL has reduced their inventory of strategic materials more than 80 percent.