TIME FOR A NEW APPROACH TO VERIFICATION

As the IAEA Director-General recently noted, “the present nuclear-arms-control regime is looking battered”. Several parties to the NPT were found to be in contravention of their obligations, notably Iraq, Iran and Libya, whose fissile materials production programs were not uncovered by routine IAEA verification activities. Moreover, many states have not concluded the obligatory safeguards agreements with the IAEA and only a small number have acceded to the Additional Protocol, there being no immediate incentive for others to do so. The present work presents a possible arrangement that could significantly improve the situation. The prerequisites for any state to join the suggested arrangement would be: an obligation not to enrich uranium or to separate plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel, and the accession to the Additional Protocol. As proposed elsewhere, enriched uranium fuel for reactors will be provided by international consortiums and will be leased to reactors’ operators. As the next step, “source materials and special fissionable material”, mentioned in the NPT, but defined in the safeguards agreements, will be redefined, to consist only of fissile materials (e.g. plutonium and HEU), and their precursors, when introduced into reprocessing-capable facilities or enrichment facilities, respectively. In addition, the quantity of fissile materials in any single state will be limited and placed under deterministic safeguards. Thus, verification in states without enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, not utilizing fissile materials, will be limited to the search for undeclared nuclear materials and activities under the Additional Protocol prerogatives. By concentrating on essentials, the potential of safeguards will be greatly enhanced. In addition, the proposed verification regime will have the benefits of a considerable reduction of the burden on both the state and the IAEA, while the purpose and objectives of the NPT will not be diminished. The paper details and discusses the implementation and the implications of the new regime.