The problematic of the technical support of advanced states to the verification*

Most of international instruments mitigate the consequences of the intrinsic limitations of their own systems of verification by relying on the support of member states. Generally, treaties and agreements make provisions to regulate the contribution of member States. But, this contribution is asymmetric. Only a small number of developed States can provide for the support of verification. United States has the most important and technically advanced contribution along with European countries, Japan, Canada, Australia and some others. Most of States less technically advanced and less wealthy are supposed to support the verification system as made up by the intrinsic means of the organisation supplied by the contribution of few States. The share of advanced technologies is limited by the need to protect sensitive information and to comply with non-proliferation commitments. This situation is not sound. It undermines the international instruments as unbiased means of verification of compliance and efficient tools to prevent the proliferation of WMD. It could jeopardise non-proliferation regimes. Some States dismiss the systems of verification (IAEA safeguards, CTBT IMS, CWC…) for its ineffectiveness. They draw the conclusion that only unilateral actions work. Some other States dismiss the systems of verification for partiality and discrimination. The paper analyses the current situation for the nuclear regimes of control and highlight it by some actual cases of new technologies. It discusses the problematic and proposes some ways to improve the situation. *Views expressed here are only the author’s personal views.