DUAL CONTAINMENT AND SURVEILLANCE: IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES AND LESSONS LEARNED

Year
2006
Author(s)
Eric V. Fitzgerald - Washington Savannah River Company
Abstract
The nuclear material industry in seeking to incorporate new technology within the working confines of controlling documents has been slow to implement functional dual c/s systems. This paper provides methodologies and examines the difficulties to implementation and accreditation of a scene-change detection and radio frequency Dual Containment / Surveillance (C/S) System. Additionally, this paper will examine the lessons learned within the previous years implementation and a discussion of the hurdles encountered, changes both in-process and under consideration, human factors influencing the operation and design of these systems. Currently, Westinghouse Savannah River Company utilizes the Continuous Item Monitoring and Surveillance System (CIMS) in the performance of Dual C/S to monitor special nuclear materials within International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards. CIMS is comprised of the Material Monitoring System (MMS) (R), a multi-media electronic surveillance system developed by Sandia National Laboratory which incorporates the use of active seals commonly called Radio Frequency Tamper Indicating Devices (RFTIDs), NT Vision (R) as developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory, a Microsoft Windows NT (R) based operating system providing for domestic scene-change detection and the Digital Multi-Camera Optical Surveillance System (DMOS) (R) which provides scenechange detection for IAEA. Although this paper will focus on the prior 12 month cycle of Dual C/S implementation utilizing the Continuous Item Monitoring and Surveillance System, the necessity for a thorough review of Safeguards and Security requirements in relation to trending, lessons learned, introduction of new failure modes, and single c/s during maintenance and outage evolutions will be discussed. Successful Dual C/S implementation plans must consider not only system design and failure modes, but must also be accompanied with the appropriate level and proper performance testing of the system within the areas credited. This is required to ensure completion of electronic activities meets or exceeds physical performance criteria.